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Overview
• Purpose: Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by 
using historic data of actual root causes of failures
• While failures have unique “proximate causes”, there are typically a finite amount of common “root causes”
• Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root 
causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric
• A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed 
actions to mitigate problems
• Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals
• Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic 
approach using past failure assessment teams’ findings predicated on human-centric causes
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Terminology Regarding Mission Failures
(from NASA NPR 8621.1B – Appendix A ; http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/ )
• Proximate Cause: The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed immediately 
before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its occurrence and, if eliminated or modified, would 
have prevented the undesired outcome. Also known as the direct cause(s).
• Root Cause: An event or condition that is an organizational factor that existed before the intermediate 
cause and directly resulted in its occurrence (thus indirectly it caused or contributed to the proximate 
cause and subsequent undesired outcome) and; if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
intermediate cause from occurring, and the undesired outcome. Typically, multiple root causes 
contribute to an undesired outcome.
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• Example #1: Titan IVB/Centaur-32 failure
• Proximate cause of failure
• Loss of upper stage roll control due to software error
• Root causes
• Erroneously (human) entered flight constant
• Human software checks failed to detect the error due to lack of understanding by staff
• Software testing lacked formality, performed with default values (not the entered flight values)
• Cape personnel did not diligently follow-up when they noticed something atypical
• Example #2: Atlas/Centaur-62 failure
• Proximate cause of failure (sequence of events)
• 1st :  Minor LOX tank leak escaped build, test, and inspection procedures
• 2nd : SOX accumulated in interstage adapter during ascent
• 3rd : SOX amplified shape charge firing shock, exceeding tank design, caused crack
• 4th : LOX escape through crack exceeded control authority of attitude control system
• Root causes
• More effective Systems Engineering (test/inspection technologies insertion,
noting missing analysis tasks)
• Test program in synch with design
Examples of Relationship between Proximate Cause of
Failure vs. Root Causes
Proximate causes tend to be unique and are difficult to anticipate in future programs. 
Root causes, however,  tend to exhibit commonalities among failures.
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Assessments of Existing Methods
• “Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA”
• Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA  study group, July 2006
• Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector 
• 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four selected as best suited for human flight
• Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects, probabilities of human errors 
• While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely 
applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy
• “Engineering a Safer World”,
• Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA
• Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.
• Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP)
• All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory
• Analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems
• Not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of 
constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safety
• System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)
• Addresses predictive part of problem (a “hazard analysis”) 
• Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: “……design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, 
cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to 
accidents”
• Can guide design process rather than require it to exist before hand
• Did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design 
without becoming unwieldy
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Approach of New Method to Assess Probability of Failure
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Recommendations 
for action
One time only
Performed for each future program under evaluation
• Establishing new method’s basis
• Review of past proximate causes of launch vehicle failures
• Establishing root causes of past launch vehicle failures based on expert judgment
• Categorizing, consolidating similar root causes into finite categories
• Establishing baseline model using root causes of past launch vehicle failures
• Selection of cases to be used
• Scoring of root and sub-root causes
• Plotting resultant data
• Derivation of function for probability of failure of launch system
• Applying the new method to conceptual designs (example): NASA/USAF Shuttle/Centaur G-Prime 
upper stage (as flown on Titan IV)
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Source data from
“Lessons Learned Applied to Space Systems Developments”
J. Nieberding & L. Ross,   Aerospace Engineering Associates LLC
Former NASA GRC executives:
successfully led several launch vehicle development programs, 60+ launch teams
Case studies of 40+ NASA and international case failures, major incidents, and shortfalls, where 
proximate causes given from failure review boards and root causes proposed
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Distribution of Root Causes In Launch Vehicle
Development/Operation
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Distribution of distinct root causes is fairly even, 
leading to decision to merely sum all causes to calculate a total
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Selected Case Studies of Launch Vehicle
Development/Operation Failures
Number in
Mission Problem Result Series Description of Total Number in Series
Research & Development
1 Atlas/Centaur F-1 Premature sheild seperation Loss of mission 8 Test flights: 7 LeRC led + F-1
2 Atlas/Centaur AC-5 Premature booster engine shutdown Loss of mission, pad See A/C F-1
3 N-1  #1 (Russian) Stage 1 failure Loss of mission 4 Four N-1's in series
4 N-1  #2 (Russian) T - 0 explosion Loss of mission, pad See N-1 #1
5 N-1  #3 (Russian) Uncontrolled roll Loss of mission See N-1 #1
6 N-1  #4 (Russian) POGO Program termination See N-1 #1
7 Titan IIIC/Centaur TC-1 Centaur engine start failure Loss of mission 1 Test flight only
8 X-43A Loss of control Loss of mission 3 Three (expendable) vehicles; one failure
Operational
1 Apollo 13 LOX tank explosion Loss of mission 20 Total Service Module flights
2 Apollo 13 Stage II POGO Potential loss of mission 13 Total Saturn V flights
3 Ariane 5  (501) Loss of control Loss of mission 92 Total up through May 2017
4 Atlas/Centaur AC-21 Fairing seperation failure Loss of mission 61 Total non-test flight A/C up to 1990 (AC-69)
5 Atlas/Centaur AC-24 Avionics hardwear failure Loss of mission See A/C-21
6 Atlas/Centaur AC-33 Loss of control Loss of mission See A/C-21
7 Atlas/Centaur AC-43 Booster engine failure Loss of mission See A/C-21
8 Atlas/Centaur AC-62 Loss of control during coast Compromised mission See A/C-21
9 Atlas/Centaur AC-67 Lightining strike Loss of mission See A/C-21
10 Space Shuttle Challenger SRM failure Loss of mission 135 Total Space Shuttle flights
11 Space Shuttle Columbia Launch-induced wing damage Loss of mission See Space Shuttle Challenger
12 Titan IIIC/Centaur TC-6 Stage 2 LOX tank problem Potential loss of mission 6 Post TC-1
13 Titan IVB/Centaur -32 Loss of control Loss of mission 16 Total Titan IV/Centaur flights
359
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Color and Numerical Scoring of Root Causes of Past Launch Vehicle Failures
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Scoring of Root Causes of Titan IVB/Centaur– 32 Failure
Sub-root cause Root
Qualitative Cause Total
Scores Scores Score
3.55
Insufficient testing (integrated system) 0.70
Lack of prudent integrated system testing
Not pursuing “test as you fly; fly as you test”
Insufficient understanding of interactions within entire system
Lack of test data of functioning system while in relevant environment
Engineering errors 0.60
Faulty hardware design, fabrication
Incorrect analytical modeling or computational errors
Ineffective Systems Engineering 0.00
Inadequate SE / engr judgment / understanding, resolving crit problems
Insufficient meaningful reviews
Failure to challenge analyses, heritage, assumptions
Analytic models uncorrelated w/ actuals, ill- scaled, or  questionable  validity
Insufficient testing (components, sub-systems) 0.00
Lack of prudent component, sub-system testing
Verification by analysis or comparison with requirements only
Heritage hardware/software: not validating for new application
Not establishing instrumentation needs
Process errors 0.80
Fabrication, test, integration, or launch process not followed
Non-standard events, work-arounds not incorporated into process
Hardware failure (flight or ground) 0.00
Poor quality or statistically out of tolerance component
Multiple unforeseen program/environment changes, or secondary effects
Faster, Better, Cheaper 0.00
Overworked staff due to imprudently short schedule
Imprudently low funding
Poor program management 0.00
Lack of leadership integrity
Inattentiveness to (or ineffectiveness in) managing problems
Normalization of Deviance (unexpected deviation, revised expectation)
Software failure (flight or ground) 0.80
Differences between functional specifications and true requirements
Insufficient (or no) IV&V
Poor team communication 0.65
Organization-to-organization differences
Insufficient formality between working groups
Insufficient use of independent review team guidance 0.00
Absence of independent assessment 
Failure to heed or fully implement recommendations
Others 0.00
International pressures
Loss of  key leader without comparable replacement
Others
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Root Causes Totals per Failure and their Cumulative Percentage Distribution
(all other 338 cases were successful (scores ≡ 0)
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Cumulative Distribution Function to Calculate the Probability of Failure
• Since any non-zero scores of root causes can result in case failure, the probability (P) of failure event (E) 
should be a cumulative distribution F
• Fx(b) =  P{E
X
b} = P{ω | X(ω) ≤ b}
• Where ω are the possible cases
• Where b is limiting score of root causes
• X is random variable of interest (the score of root causes for any case)
• The probability of a successful case (i.e. score = 0) ≡ Fx(a) = Fx(0) = P{ω | X(ω) ≤ 0}
• Number of case studies considered (the sample space Ω) =  359
• Number of failures: 21
• Thus, probability of success of entire sample space Ω = (359-21)/359 = 0.9415 
• Chance of failure = (1 - 0.9415) = 0.0585 or one chance of failure out of ~ 17 attempts
• Example: probability that a case is a failure and its score is ≤ 3.60 is given by:
• P{ω | a < X(ω) ≤ b} =  Fx(b) - Fx(a) = ((359-21) + 16)/359 - 0.9415 = 0.9861 - 0.9415 = 0.0446
• Chance of failure: one out of ~ 22 attempts
• Corresponding reliability = 95.5 %
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Shuttle/Centaur G-Prime Upper Stage and Titan IV Launch Vehicle
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Scoring of Shuttle/Centaur G-Prime Upper Stage
Sub-root cause Root
Qualitative Cause Total
Scores Scores Score
4.20
Insufficient testing (integrated system) 0.50
Lack of prudent integrated system testing No altitude propulsive stage test at 109%;  PLIS mount failures; CISS prop valves erratic ops p. 206
Not pursuing “test as you fly; fly as you test” Structural dynamic test campaign, system integration facility (for avionics, S/W, others) System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec 1983) reports
Insufficient understanding of interactions within entire system Most of Centaur adopted/leveraged from existing, long heritage Atlas/Centaur program
Lack of test data of functioning system while in relevant environment Most of Centaur adopted/leveraged from existing, long heritage Atlas/Centaur program
Engineering errors 0.00
Faulty hardware design, fabrication System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec 1983) reports
Incorrect analytical modeling or computational errors System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec 1983) reports
Ineffective Systems Engineering 0.70
Inadequate SE / engr judgment / understanding, resolving crit problems Repeated JSC safety-driven changes in critical fluid dump system interface between Shuttle & Centaur; "fundamental problem throughout program";Taming LH2 text (TLH) p.200
Insufficient meaningful reviews System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec 1983) reports
Failure to challenge analyses, heritage, assumptions Repeated LeRC challenging of astronauts' LH2 concern with Centaur vs. ET (TLH p. 197)
Analytic models uncorrelated w/ actuals, ill- scaled, or  questionable  validity Modal survey performed on test article, trajectory design code based on past Atlas/Centaur flight data, etc.
Insufficient testing (components, sub-systems) 0.00
Lack of prudent component, sub-system testing System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec 1983) reports
Verification by analysis or comparison with requirements only System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec 1983) reports
Heritage hardware/software: not validating for new application System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec 1983) reports
Not establishing instrumentation needs System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec 1983) reports
Process errors 0.30
Fabrication, test, integration, or launch process not followed Observed lower quality manufacturing, transport, and contractor staff acctions (TLH p. 209-210)
Non-standard events, work-arounds not incorporated into process None identified
Hardware failure (flight or ground) 0.20
Poor quality or statistically out of tolerance component n/a
Multiple unforeseen program/environment changes, or secondary effects Change from "Element" to "Payload" designation drove critical hardware changes late in development
Faster, Better, Cheaper 0.50
Overworked staff due to imprudently short schedule Contractor, LeRC leadership  50 to 70 hr weeks year after year p. 196-198; short sched in 1986 p. 205
Imprudently low funding ~$2B current year funding over 4.5 years; Joint NASA & USAF funding
Poor program management 0.60
Lack of leadership integrity LeRC securing 109% SSME throttle baseline (TLH p. 205, 208, 209)
Inattentiveness to (or ineffectiveness in) managing problems JSC intergration staff rather than JSC engineering staff; delayed tech responses, safety issues (such as FDD)
Normalization of Deviance (unexpected deviation, revised expectation) JSC Shuttle lift capability/commitment
Software failure (flight or ground) 0.00
Differences between functional specifications and true requirements System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec 1983) reports
Insufficient (or no) IV&V System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec 1983) reports
Poor team communication 0.90
Organization-to-organization differences JSC unresponsive to LeRC technical data requests; difference in Center cultures, JSC Integration vs. Technical staff experise (TLH; p196 to 219)
Insufficient formality between working groups Sufficient technical working groups between LeRC and GDSSD
Insufficient use of independent review team guidance 0.50
Absence of independent assessment No NAR convened ; continued Safety concerns by astronauts p.197-199 and 206-207
Failure to heed or fully implement recommendations n/a
Others 0.00
International pressures n/a
Loss of  key leader without comparable replacement n/a
Others n/a
• Probability of failure:
Projected:  4.46%  (score: 4.20)
Actual:       6.67 %
• Observation of sub-root causes: 
almost complete reverse scoring         
between Titan IVB/Centaur – 32 
and Shuttle/Centaur G-Prime
change in program leadership
change in manufacturer
15 year gap (1985 to 1999)
• Implies necessity of scoring 
program development and launch 
within reasonable time periods and 
similar staff
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Caveats
• While generally acknowledging shortcomings of accepted methods and need for improvement, concerns were raised by
• NASA Headquarters Safety Center
• NASA GRC Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance Office
• “Non-zero score successes” should be incorporated into cumulative distribution function: requires reviewing of 338 successful mission post flight reports 
(considerable effort)
• Positive actions (adaptations to new information or feedback loops in decision making) not incorporated 
• Widely acknowledged as essential for successful outcomes
• Omission represents meaningful modeling deficiency in assessments of probability of failure
• Sample set incomplete, lacking launch scrubs/delays: rejected due to seemingly infinite amount of “what if” speculation
• “Color coded” results helpful, but the numerical scoring might imply precision which does not exist
• Existing methods (Failure Modes Effects Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Human Reliability Analysis, etc.) already accommodate human factors: rejected 
due to anticipated resource-intensive needs if applied system-wide
• Small sample size of 21 launches implies significant statistical error
• Scoring was greatly influenced by sample space definition:
• Greatest probability of failure of any case considered was 5.85 % (corresponding to a score of > 6.25)
• Consideration of more failure cases could increase range of potential scores (and more representative of history)
• Potential major weaknesses if there is a significant change in 
• Organization which leads development or performs launch operations (or both)
• Time between application method and launch operations
• Greatest vulnerability to criticism : “20-20 hindsight bias”
• Comprehension of circumstances more important than judging past actions as imprudent, insufficient
• Failure/mishap reports frequently do not describe in great detail various options available
• Obvious poor decision in hindsight frequently appears to be correct decision in heat of the moment 
• Thus, reliance on (even) complete accident investigation board reports and experts with impressive comprehensive experience can still be subject 
to serious, credible criticism
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Summary and Conclusions
• Considerable number of methods to evaluate reliability of systems already exist
• Most from nuclear power industry, a few from NASA 
• Both reassessing and prognosticating
• Many incorporate human-causal factors
• Most are best suited for detailed analysis of focused sub-systems, components
• Reliability estimates from existing methods
• Create optimistic failure probability estimates when compared to actuals
• Create complex, resource-intensive efforts if applied launch vehicle system-wide
• Predicated on component hardware reliability and statistical analysis --- minor historic root cause of failures
• Typically do not focus on human–centric root causes
• While proximate causes are failure case-unique, root causes tend to aggregate into finite, common categories
• Proposed new method to assess reliability of conceptual launch vehicle system based on historic data of human-centric root causes
• Single example 
• Totals agree well with actuals
• Sub-root causes had almost complete reverse scoring (between Titan IVB/Centaur – 32 and Shuttle/Centaur G-Prime), 
attributed to change in program leadership, change in manufacturer, and 15 year gap (1985 to 1999)
• More testing warranted
While lacking in precision and accuracy, it is based on comprehensive, known root causes of launch vehicle failures.
Recommendation: apply new method to access probability of failure to currently
in-development launch vehicle programs
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